

that games are largely ends in themselves. Their purpose, if they have a purpose, is to give people pleasure. In that respect, they differ greatly from those groupings of people which are usually regarded as the centrepieces of social life and which hold a correspondingly central position in sociology, from groupings such as factories with the purpose of producing goods, bureaucracies with that of administering states or other enterprises, and from other, equally useful figurations of people which are not normally regarded as ends in themselves or supposed to give people pleasure. It agrees with this scheme of values that sociologists often try to define organizations and social units in general, in the first place by means of their goals.

But if it is a limitation of the study of sport-games – compared with that of social units concerned with the serious business of life – that they have no purpose except perhaps that of providing enjoyment, and are often pursued as ends in themselves, it is also an advantage. It may serve as a corrective to the teleological fallacy still fairly widespread in sociological thinking. In a simplified manner, this can be described as a confusion between the individual level and the group level. With regard to games of football this distinction is fairly clear. Individual players and teams have aims, scoring goals is one of them. The enjoyment of playing, the excitement of spectators, the hope of rewards may be others. But the concatenation of purposeful actions results in a figurational dynamics – in a game – which is purposeless. One can determine it as such and to some extent that has been done here. But this could not have been done if one had attributed the aims of individual players to the changing figuration which the players form with each other.

How far this is true of other figurations of people need not be discussed here. But one can say that even state organizations, churches, factories, and other figurations of the more serious kind, whatever the aims of the people who form them, are at the same time ends in themselves with dynamics of their own. What, after all, are the purposes of nations? It is not entirely frivolous to say that even they resemble a game played by people with one another for its own sake. To neglect this aspect by focusing attention in the first place on their purposes, means overlooking the fact that, as in football, it is the changing figuration of people itself on which at any given time the decisions, the purposes, and the moves of individuals depend. This is particularly so in the case of tensions and conflicts. They are often explained only in terms of the intentions and aims of one side or the other. Sociologists would perhaps be better able to contribute to an understanding of those tensions and conflicts which have so far proved uncontrollable if they would investigate them as aspects of the purposeless dynamics of groups.

Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning,  
*Quest for Excitement: Sport and Leisure  
 in the Civilizing Process*  
 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986)

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## The Dynamics of Modern Sport: Notes on Achievement-Striving and the Social Significance of Sport

*Eric Dunning*

### I INTRODUCTION

The subject of this essay is what I take to be, world-wide, the dominant trend in modern sport, namely a trend, at all levels of participation but most conspicuously in top-level sport, towards growing competitiveness, seriousness of involvement and achievement-orientation.<sup>1</sup> Expressed differently, the trend I am referring to involves the gradual but seemingly inexorable erosion of 'amateur' attitudes, values and structures, and their correlative replacement by attitudes, values and structures that are 'professional' in one sense or another of that term. Viewed from yet another angle, it is a trend in which, in countries all over the world, sport is being transformed from a marginal, lowly valued institution into one that is central and much more highly valued, an institution which, for many people, seems to have religious or quasi-religious significance in the sense that it has become one of the central, if not *the* central, sources of identification, meaning and gratification in their lives.

Resistance to this trend has been offered on several occasions, in Britain perhaps most notably in the attempt since the end of the nineteenth century to maintain Rugby Union as a player-centred amateur sport based on voluntary organization and an informal framework of 'friendly' matches, that is as a sport in which the rules are designed to secure enjoyment for players rather than spectators, organization at the club, regional and national levels is undertaken as an unpaid avocation, and there is no structure of formal competition, of 'cups' and 'leagues'.

However, the attempt to maintain such a structure has been conspicuously unsuccessful. Despite strenuous efforts by the game's ruling groups, top-level matches are now played in front of large crowds and several spectator-oriented rules have been introduced. Clubs also compete annually for the John Player Cup and a number of local ones besides, and there is a system of 'merit tables' which are leagues in all but name. Moreover, the national controlling body, the Rugby Football Union, and many top clubs are financially dependent on revenue from match attendances and commercial sponsorship. The RFU also employs a number of permanent officials, and there have been repeated rumours of players who are paid. In short, in this as in other cases, the resistance has been overcome, a fact which suggests that the trend towards growing seriousness and competitiveness or, alternatively, towards the 'de-amateurization' of sport, is a compelling social process.<sup>2</sup>

To say this is not to claim that resistance has died out altogether. Conflict over the issue of play-oriented, amateur versus achievement-oriented, professional forms and conceptions of sport continues in Rugby and elsewhere, hence attesting to the fact that this process is not simply a thing of the past. Moreover, besides being compelling and ongoing, this process was, and is, conflictual, a fact which shows that it is an example of what Elias would call a 'blind' or 'unplanned' long-term social process.<sup>3</sup> That is, it is not the result of the intended acts of any single individual or group but, rather, the unintended outcome of the interweaving of the purposive actions of the members of several interdependent groups over several generations.

What I want to do in this paper is to sketch in the outlines of a sociogenetic explanation of this long-term process, i.e. an explanation of the manner in which it was and continues to be socially or structurally generated. This means, positively, that I shall seek an explanation in terms of the immanent structure and dynamics of social relationships *per se*, and, negatively, that I shall eschew three kinds of sociological explanations that are common, namely: (1) explanations in terms of psychological or 'action' principles that ignore the patterns of interdependence within which human beings live; (2) explanations in terms of ideas and beliefs that are conceptually treated as 'free-floating', that is to say in abstraction from the social settings in which ideas are always developed and expressed; and (3) explanations in terms of abstract and impersonal social forces – for example 'economic' forces – that are reified and considered as existing independently of the interdependent human beings who generate them. In order to accomplish this task, I shall employ the 'figurational' method developed by Elias<sup>4</sup> and, to illustrate what this means, I shall begin by reviewing the article on the 'Dynamics of Sport Groups' that Elias and I published in 1966.

## II THE 'DYNAMICS OF SPORT GROUPS' – A BRIEF REVIEW

The central contention of that article is that sport groups are a type of social figurations and that their dynamics are best conceptualized as a tension-balance struck between the opposites in a whole complex of interdependent polarities. What this means is that, viewed sociologically, a sport or game is a 'structure' or 'pattern' that a group of interdependent human beings form with one another. This structure, pattern or, more properly, figuration comprises: (1) the two individuals or teams who co-operate with one another in more or less friendly rivalry; (2) controlling agents such as referees and linesmen; and (3) sometimes, but not always, a greater or lesser number of spectators. However, the immediate figuration formed by those who participate directly in and are present at a game forms part of a wider figuration that consists, on one level, of the club organizations that pick the teams and are responsible for such matters as the provision and maintenance of playing facilities and, on another, of the legislative and administrative bodies that formulate the rules, certify and appoint the controlling officials, and organize the overall competitive framework. In its turn this figuration forms part of the wider figuration constituted by members of the society as a whole and, in its turn, too, the societal figuration exists in an international framework. In short, sports and games as social figurations are organized and controlled as well as watched and played. Moreover, they are not socially detached and free-floating, unconnected with the wider structure of social interdependencies but closely, often intricately, interwoven with the fabric of society at large and with the manner in which that fabric is woven into the structure of international interdependencies.

The concept of the dynamics of sport-groups refers to games as processes, that is to the fluid, changing pattern formed, as it were 'body and soul', by the interdependent participants as a game runs its course. It is a pattern which they form with their whole selves, that is intellectually and emotionally and not just physically. The concept of a tension-balance is based on an organic analogy. Thus, just as the mobility of an animal limb depends on the contained tension between two balancing yet antagonistic muscle groups, so, we suggested, the game-process depends upon a tension between two simultaneously antagonistic and interdependent players or sets of players who keep each other in a fluctuating equilibrium. And this tension-equilibrium is best conceptualized as a balance struck between the opposites in a whole complex of interdependent polarities. Among these interdependent polarities – although this was not intended to constitute an exhaustive list – we specified the following:

- (1) the overall polarity between the two opposing teams;
- (2) the polarity between attack and defence;
- (3) the polarity between co-operation and tension between the two teams;
- (4) the polarity between co-operation and competition within each team;
- (5) the polarity between the external control of players on a variety of levels (for example by managers, captains, team-mates, referees, linesmen, spectators, and so on) and the flexible control which the individual player exercises on himself or herself;
- (6) the polarity between affectionate identification with and hostile rivalry towards the opponents;
- (7) the polarity between the enjoyment of aggression by the individual players and the curb imposed upon such enjoyment by the game-pattern;
- (8) the polarity between elasticity and fixity of rules.

It is, we hypothesized, the tension-balance between interdependent polarities such as these which determines the 'tone' of a game, that is whether it is experienced as exciting or dull, or whether it remains a 'mock-fight' or breaks out into fighting in earnest. It is also implicit in our conceptualization that such a tension-balance is partly a consequence of the relatively autonomous dynamics of specific game-figurations, and partly a consequence of the manner in which such figurations are articulated into the wider structure of social interdependencies.

This discussion must be enough for present purposes to illustrate this conceptualization. It remains, I think, a fruitful one, yet, in retrospect, it strikes me that it depended partly on assumptions that derive from an amateur conception of sport, from what Elias would regard as a specific 'heteronomous evaluation'.<sup>5</sup> These assumptions, whilst not leading us astray, did, I think, limit our vision and prevent us from developing the analysis further in at least one important respect. In order to show how this was so, it is necessary first to recall our objects in writing on the dynamics of sport groups. In writing such an essay, we did not hope to contribute simply to the sociology of sport but wanted, rather, to suggest to sociologists more generally that sport groups can serve as a means of illustrating the dangers, firstly of treating conflict and consensus as crudely dichotomous opposites, and secondly of committing the teleological fallacy in conceptualizing group dynamics – of attributing 'purposes' to reified social constructs. It was in the context of a discussion of these issues that our dependency on amateur values became arguably apparent. Thus, in a passage where we contrasted sport

groups with industrial, administrative and other associations concerned with what are generally regarded as the 'serious' sides of life, we wrote that the 'purpose' of sport groups, 'if they have a purpose, is to give people pleasure'<sup>6</sup> and we went on to mention, as other goals or purposes of the people involved in sport-groups, striving for rewards of a financial or status kind, and providing excitement for spectators. But we did not discuss the fact that these purposes involve different forms of valency, that is of bonding, or, more simply, of relationships, between the immediate play-group and others. Thus, enjoyment-seeking is, on balance, self-directed or egocentric, whilst reward-striving and providing excitement for spectators are, on balance and in different senses, other-directed. This suggests three things: (1) that these purposes emerge as the principal goal of sport within different patterns of interdependence; (2) that they can, under specific circumstances, be incompatible with one another, and hence, the source of strain and conflict; and (3) that the list of interdependent polarities involved in the dynamics of sport groups can be extended by at least the following two, namely: (a) the polarity between the interests of players and the interests of spectators; (b) the polarity between 'seriousness' and 'play'.

As I hope to show, these two polarities are closely interrelated. They are also crucial in the sense that they have ramifying effects on the other interdependent polarities involved in the dynamics of a game. Thus, if players participate seriously in a game, the tension-level will be raised and, beyond a certain point, the incidence of hostile rivalry both within and between teams is likely to be increased; that is the game is likely to be transformed from a mock-fight in the direction of a 'real' one and players are liable to transgress the rules, to commit acts of 'foul' play. Or, to the degree that spectators become seriously identified with the teams they support, they are less liable to contemplate defeat with equanimity and may act in ways that are intended to affect the outcome of the contest. Again, once a certain point is reached, they may even invade the pitch in an attempt to suspend the contest altogether.

### III SOME THEORIES OF MODERN SPORT: A BRIEF CRITIQUE

The polarity between the interests of players and spectators, and that between 'seriousness' and 'play', have already formed the subjects of theory-building exercises in the sociology of sport, most notably, from a historical-philosophical standpoint by Huizinga;<sup>7</sup> from a symbolic interactionist perspective by Stone;<sup>8</sup> and from a Marxist standpoint by Rigauer.<sup>9</sup> In his own way, each of these authors argues that the balance between these polarities has been upset in modern sport, and a critical



review of what they wrote will, I hope, provide a basis for demonstrating the superiority of Elias's figurational approach as a means for obtaining an 'object-adequate' analysis of what constitutes a central trend in modern sport, that is an analysis that accounts for and explains this trend simply as such, without ideological embroidering or distortion.

Huizinga's central contention is that, prior to the nineteenth century, Western societies maintained a balance between the polarities of seriousness and play. However, with industrialization, the growth of science and the emergence of egalitarian social movements, he argues that seriousness began to gain the ascendancy. At first glance, the fact that the nineteenth century witnessed the large-scale growth of sports would seem to contradict his thesis but Huizinga contends that it tends to confirm it since, in modern sports as he puts it, 'the old play factor has undergone almost complete atrophy.' As part of the decline of the play-element in modern civilization generally, sports have experienced what he calls a 'fatal shift towards overseriousness'. The distinction between amateurs and professionals is, he contends, the clearest indication of this trend. That is because professionals lack 'spontaneity and carelessness' and no longer truly play whilst, at the same time, their performance is superior, leading amateurs to feel inferior and engage in imitative action. Between them, according to Huizinga, these two groups

push sport further and further away from the play-sphere proper until it becomes a thing *sui generis*, neither play nor earnest. In modern social life sport occupies a place alongside and apart from the cultural process . . . [it] has become profane, 'unholy' in every way and has no organic connection with the structure of society, least of all when prescribed by the government . . . However important it may be for the players or spectators, it remains sterile.<sup>10</sup>

But apart from descriptively relating it to a general trend and pointing to what he regarded as the destructive effects of the interaction between amateurs and professionals, Huizinga failed to address himself to the dynamics, the sociogenesis of the presumed trend towards 'sterility', 'overseriousness' and 'profaneness' in modern sport. This issue is tackled more satisfactorily by Stone, who modifies Huizinga's arguments, suggesting that modern sports are subject to a twofold dynamic that results, partly from the manner in which they are caught up in the 'contests, tensions, ambivalences and anomalies' of the wider society, and partly because of certain features inherent in their structure. Only the latter aspect of his analysis need concern us here.

'All sport', Stone contends, 'is affected by the antinomial principles

of play and display', that is oriented towards producing satisfaction either for players or spectators. But 'display' for spectators is 'dis-play', according to Stone, destructive of the play-character of sport. Whenever large numbers of spectators attend a sports event, it is transformed into a spectacle, played for the spectators and not the direct participants. The interests of the former take precedence over the interests of the latter. Enjoyment from playing becomes subordinate to the production of crowd-pleasing moves. The sport begins to lose its uncertainty, spontaneity and character of playful innovation, becoming a type of ritual, predictable, even predetermined in its outcome.

Rigauer's analysis depends heavily on Marxist assumptions about the exploitative character of work in capitalist societies, a category that he extends to societies such as the Soviet Union presumably because he believes them to be 'state-capitalist' or 'state-socialist' in character and not essentially different from capitalist societies of a 'purer' type. Modern sport, he argues, is a 'bourgeois' product, a type of recreation initially pursued by members of the ruling class for their own enjoyment. For them, it functioned as a counter to work but, with increasing industrialization and the spread of sport down the social hierarchy, it has come to take on characteristics which resemble those of work. Thus, like forms of work in industrial societies, Rigauer maintains, sport is coming to be characterized by achievement-striving. This is seen in the drive to break records, in the hours of gruelling training that are employed towards that end, and in the application of scientific methods to the goal of improving performance. Moreover, training techniques such as 'interval' and 'circuit' training replicate the 'alienating' and 'dehumanizing' character of assembly-line production. Even in the 'individual' sports, the role of sportsman is being reduced to one in a whole constellation of trainers, coaches, managers and doctors, a tendency which is doubly apparent in the team sports where the modern sportsman is compelled to fit into a fixed division of labour and comply with the demands of a prescribed tactical plan. He plays little part himself in working out this plan.

His scope for the exercise of initiative is correspondingly reduced. That is even more true of the administration of sports for, increasingly, it is full-time officials and not sportsmen themselves who decide matters of policy. The result, says Rigauer, is a steady constriction of the scope for private decision-making and dominance over the majority by a bureaucratic elite.

It follows from this diagnosis that sport must increasingly be unable to function as a means of providing relief from the strains of work. It has become, Rigauer contends, demanding, achievement-oriented and alienating. The belief that it functions as a counter to work survives but



it is a 'masking ideology' that hides from the participants its 'real' function, namely that of reinforcing in the leisure-sphere an ethic of hard work, achievement and group loyalty which is necessary for the operation of an advanced industrial society. In this way, according to Rigauer, sport helps to maintain the status quo and to bolster the dominance of the ruling class.

These three diagnoses – that sport is growing more 'serious'; that 'display' is coming to predominate over and destroy 'play'; and that sport is becoming indistinguishable from work – seem, at first glance, apposite as descriptions of a central trend in modern sport. However, elements of value-bias enter each of these analyses, casting doubts on their adequacy. It is, for example, difficult to believe that sports could have managed to sustain their popularity, indeed, to increase it as, in fact, they have done in countries all over the world, if the play-factor in them had atrophied to the extent that Huizinga asserts, or if, as Rigauer contends, they had become as alienating and repressive as work, or again if, as Stone would have it, the balance between play and display had been so seriously upset. It is possible, of course, that forms of compulsion and/or of rewards other than direct personal enjoyment may have played a part in their spread, hence offsetting to some extent the deleterious effects of growing seriousness of involvement. That such balancing counter-trends have, in fact, occurred is implicit in the arguments put forward later in this essay. But for the moment, it is sufficient just to note that Huizinga, Rigauer and Stone pay no attention to such a possibility.

Moreover, Huizinga is a romantic who yearns for an 'organic' society. It is also implicit in his analysis that the 'democratization' of sports is the main reason for their 'decay'. In short, he implies that creativity and high moral standards are restricted to elites. His critique of modern sports strikes home, especially, although he exaggerates it, his contention that a 'shift towards overseriousness' has occurred. Yet, apart from relating it to what he regards as a general cultural trend, he makes no attempt to analyze the sociogenesis of this putative transformation of sport, to relate it firmly to its social structural sources.

Similar considerations apply to Rigauer's critique. He makes no attempt to analyse empirically the manner in which the alleged structural correspondence between sport and work has been brought about. Nor does he distinguish between forms of work, forms of sport and different countries in this respect, or make any attempt to determine whether different groups are proponents, on the one hand, of achievement-oriented values or, on the other, of values which stress the pleasure-giving, leisure character of sport. Nor does he attempt to document empirically the changes which, he maintains, have occurred

over time in the balance between these values. Instead, he simply paints a blanket picture which asserts that all sports in all industrial countries have developed work-like characteristics and hence serve ruling interests to the same extent.

Although, like Huizinga, he lays stress on the deleterious effects of the democratization of sports, Stone's analysis is sociologically more satisfactory. Yet there is reason to believe that his analysis of the balance between 'play' and 'display' may not reach to the heart of the matter. Viewed figuratively, this is not simply a question of the presence or absence of spectators or, where the latter are present, of the interaction between them and the players, but, more crucially, of the *patterns of interdependence* among the participating groups. Thus, the presence of spectators at a sports-event may *induce* players to engage in display but it cannot *constrain* them to do so. The play-element in a sport is more likely to be seriously threatened when players become *dependent* on spectators – or on external agencies such as commercial interest groups and the state – for financial and other rewards. Under such conditions, whether the sport is openly professional or nominally amateur, the pressures to allow the interests of spectators to assume an important role, for the 'game' to become a 'spectacle', are likely to be compelling.

In fact, in examining the development of modern sport, neither Huizinga, Rigauer nor Stone has dealt satisfactorily with the dynamics of that process. Their analyses are, in a sense, curiously impersonal. Each of them postulates a trend connected with industrialization, but they pay little or no attention to clashes of group interest and ideology. It almost appears in their analyses – this is especially true of Huizinga and Rigauer – as if the old values and forms of sport were fading away without conflict. That such a conceptualization is oversimplified, whatever its merits as a first approximation to a sociological theory of the dominant trend in modern sport, will, I hope, emerge from a figurational analysis of this trend.

In what follows, I want to suggest that the growing seriousness of modern sport can be in large part attributed to three interrelated processes, namely, state-formation, functional democratization and the spread of sport through the widening network of international interdependencies. The first two are, of course, the deep-structural processes, both interwoven with the lengthening of interdependency chains, by means of which Elias principally explains the sociogenesis of the civilizing process.<sup>11</sup>

This suggests that there may be a connection between the civilizing process and the trend towards growing seriousness of involvement in sport; for example the latter may consist partly in the fact that, by

virtue of his or her socialization into the more restraining standards of the more complex and constraining modern system of social interdependencies, the more restrained and civilized modern individual is less able to participate spontaneously and uninhibitedly in sport than his or her less civilized and more emotionally unrestrained forebear who lived in a less complex and less constraining system of social interdependencies. It seems plausible to maintain that this is so. Yet it remains necessary to spell out precisely what the connections were between, on the one hand, the growing seriousness of sports participation and, on the other, state-formation, functional democratization and the civilizing process. It also remains to show how this trend was connected with the international spread of sport, and how these deep-structural processes can provide a more satisfactory account of it than was achieved by Huizinga, Rigauer and Stone.<sup>12</sup> It is to the first of these tasks that I shall now address myself.

#### IV A FIGURATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE TREND TOWARDS GROWING SERIOUSNESS IN SPORT

In order to accomplish such a demonstration, I shall first discuss the amateur ethos and attempt to explain sociogenetically both it and its dissolution, that is the trend towards growing seriousness in sport. I shall then, briefly and in general terms, discuss sport in pre-industrial Britain in order to show why, in such a social figuration, it was possible for groups at all levels of the social hierarchy, to have what were, on balance, 'self-directed' or 'egocentric' forms of sports participation, that is why it was possible for them to participate in sport for fun. Next, I shall attempt to show why, with the emergence of urban-industrial-national-states, more 'other-directed' sport-forms connected more with achievement-orientation, identity-striving and the struggle for pecuniary rewards came to develop. Finally, I shall discuss what I take to be the growing social significance of sport and the part played by its spread internationally in this overall social process.

The amateur ethos is the dominant sports ideology in modern Britain and, I think I am right in saying, of ruling groups in sport across the world, for example of the International Olympic Committee and its various national affiliates. The central component of this ethos is the ideal of playing sports 'for fun'. Other aspects, such as the stress on 'fair play', voluntary adherence to rules and non-pecuniary involvement, are essentially subordinate, designed to facilitate the achievement of that end – to make sporting contests 'play-fights' in which pleasurable

excitement can be generated. The earliest example I have found of the explicit use of this ethos to criticize the trend towards growing seriousness in sport appears in a book by Trollope, published in 1868:

[Sports] are being made too much of, and men who follow them have allowed themselves to be taught that ordinary success in them is not worth having . . . All this comes from excess of enthusiasm on the matter; – from a desire to follow too well a pursuit which, to be pleasurable, should be a pleasure and not a business . . . [This] is the rock against which our sports may possibly be made shipwreck. Should it ever become unreasonable in its expenditure, arrogant in its demands, immoral and selfish in its tendencies, or, worse of all, unclean and dishonest in its traffic, there will arise against it a public opinion against which it will be unable to hold its own.<sup>13</sup>

It is, of course, likely that earlier examples could be found, but this mobilization of amateur values, with their stress on pleasure as the essential ingredient of sport, came at an early stage in the development of the modern forms of sport, above all at a time when professional sport as we know it today hardly existed. It was then possible for some men to earn a precarious living as prize-fighters, jockeys and cricketers, but the fact that they were only a handful suggests that Trollope's critique was directed mainly at a trend towards growing seriousness within *amateur* sport. And it is possible that one of his principal targets was what historians have called the 'public school games cult',<sup>15</sup> a movement in the public schools that involved five main components: (1) a tendency to appoint and promote staff in terms of sporting rather than academic criteria; (2) the selection of prefects, that is the leading boys in a school, principally on the basis of ability at sport; (3) the elevation of sport to a prominent and, in some cases, pre-eminent position in the curriculum; (4) the educational rationalization of sport, especially team-games, as an instrument of 'character-training'; and (5) participation by members of staff in the organization and playing of their pupils' games. It is, of course, likely that such a movement could only have arisen in elite schools, the majority of whose pupils were not dependent on an academic education for their future careers. But that is less relevant for present purposes than the fact that the public school games cult shows clearly that the trend towards growing seriousness in sport in Britain was, in its earliest stages, a phenomenon connected with amateur and not professional sport and that it did not derive its initial momentum from the conflict between amateurs and professionals adduced by Huizinga. In fact, I should like to hypothesize that the amateur ethos was articulated as an ideology in opposition to the trend

towards growing seriousness and that it received its most explicit and detailed formulation when, as part of that trend, the modern forms of professional sport began to emerge.

In Britain prior to the 1880s, the amateur ethos existed in a relatively inchoate form. That is, it was an amorphous, loosely articulated set of values regarding the functions of sport and the standards believed necessary for their realization. However, with the threat posed by the incipient professionalization of new sports such as soccer and rugby, a process that began in the North and Midlands and drew low-status, regionally based, middle- and working-class groups as organizers, players and spectators into the ambit of sports that had hitherto been the exclusive preserve of the 'public school elite',<sup>15</sup> the national ruling class, the amateur ethos began to crystallize as an elaborate and articulate ideology. That is, it was a collective representation developed by the members of one collectivity in opposition to the members of another which they perceived as a threat both to their organizational and playing pre-eminence and the forms of sport as they wished to see it played. In short, I am suggesting that, even though the public school elite tended to couch their pronouncements in sport-specific terms, claiming to be solely interested in preserving what they regarded as the essential, 'fun-oriented' character of sport, class and regional hostility and resentment over the loss of their erstwhile dominance played an important part in their articulation of the amateur ethos as an explicit ideology. However, if I am right, the social situation in which they found themselves was increasingly inconducive to the full-scale, unbridled realization of self-directed, pleasure-oriented forms of sport and that, in articulating and mobilizing the amateur ethos in response to the growing threat from below, they were trying to maintain forms of sports participation which they regarded as their right as members of a ruling class and which had, in fact, been possible for ruling and even subordinate groups in the pre-industrial era but which were increasingly impossible for them.

Support for this view comes from the fact that many of the 'abuses' that the public school elite claimed to detect in professional sport were at least equally evident in the games cult in the schools they had attended. Further support – although there were symptomatic exceptions such as 'the Corinthians' soccer team<sup>16</sup> – comes from the fact that, in an increasing number of sports, the public school elite withdrew into their own exclusive circles, revealing by their fear of being beaten by professionals that they played in order to obtain the kudos of being recognized as successful sportsmen as much as they did for fun. Of course, this separatist trend was probably, in part, occasioned by the fact that contests between professional and amateur teams would fre-

quently have been unbalanced and lacking in tone owing to the skill discrepancy that usually exists between full-time players who are following their occupation and part-time players who are merely participating in a leisure activity. But that this is not the whole story is suggested by the fact that a further separatist trend by members of the public school elite occurred within the ranks of *amateur* sport. That is, they were unwilling to submit themselves regularly to the possibility of defeat at the hands of working-class amateur teams and, by hiving off into their own exclusive circles, they showed, not only class prejudice, but that they took part in sport seriously and in order to win – the success goal had come to take precedence in their hierarchy of sporting values over the goal of participating primarily for fun. Further support for such a view comes from a figurational analysis of sport in eighteenth-century Britain.

The overall social figuration of Britain in the eighteenth century, indeed, the overall pattern of social interdependencies in pre-industrial Britain generally, was one in which there was relatively little structural pressure on groups, whether high or low in the status order, towards success-striving and achievement-orientation, that is towards 'other-directed' forms of participation, in the sporting or in other fields. The relatively low degree of state-centralization and national unification, for example, meant that 'folk games', the games of the ordinary people, were played in regional isolation, competition traditionally occurring between contiguous villages and towns or between the sections of towns. But there was no national competitive framework. The aristocracy and gentry formed a partial exception in this regard. They were, and perceived themselves as, national classes and did compete nationally among themselves. As a result, a certain degree of other-directed competitive pressure in sporting activities was generated within their ranks. But they were subject, in a general and sporting sense, to effective pressure neither from above nor from below. The level of state-formation at that stage in the development of British society was relatively low and, in a very real sense, the aristocracy and gentry 'were the state', that is able effectively to use the state apparatus in their own interests. They had established the precedence of parliament over the monarchy and ruled over a society in which the balance of power between classes involved gross inequalities. As a result, there was no effective challenge to their position as the dominant class. The secure character of their dominance was conducive to a high degree of status security on their part and this meant, in turn, that individual aristocrats and gentlemen were, as a rule, in no way seriously threatened by contact with social subordinates. Whatever the context, they knew who was master and so did everybody else – the gross power



imbalance between classes led to patterns of deference from subordinates.

Such status-security was extended to the leisure-sphere, including sport. The aristocracy and gentry took part in folk games both in an organizational and playing capacity, and used their patronage to develop forms of professional cricket, prize-fighting and horse-racing. The type of sports career that grew up under such conditions was based on unequivocal subordination of the professional to his patron and total dependency as far as life-chances were concerned of the former on the latter. No threat was posed by professionalism of that type to the interests and values of the ruling class. Professional sport was neither morally nor socially suspect and there was no need to fight against or hide the fact that pecuniary advantage could be obtained from games, whether as an occupational wage or from gambling on the outcome of contests. Above all, whether playing among themselves or with their hirelings, the aristocracy and gentry could participate in sport for fun; that is, their social situation – the power and relative autonomy they enjoyed – meant that they could develop self-directed or egocentric forms of sports participation and that, although they were not constrained to develop the amateur ethos as an explicit ideology, they came close to being amateurs in the 'ideal typical' sense of that term.

If this diagnosis is correct, it follows that the overall social figuration of pre-industrial Britain and, I think one can safely say, of other pre-industrial societies, too, was not conducive to the generation of intense competitive pressure in sporting relations, whether within or between ruling and subordinate groups. It also follows that the sociogenesis of the pressure towards other-directed, achievement-oriented forms of sports-participation has to be sought in the social figuration brought into being in conjunction with industrialization. I shall now endeavour to point out what the connections between these two social processes were, that is between industrialization and the long-term trend towards increasing seriousness of involvement and achievement-striving in sport. Briefly, and in anticipation of the analysis that follows, it can be said that the key to this relationship lies in the process that Elias calls 'functional democratization' – in the equalizing change in the balance of power within and between groups that occurs contingently upon the interrelated processes of state-formation and lengthening of interdependency chains. But before I explain what this means, it is necessary to contrast Elias's approach to the division of labour with that of Durkheim.

## V INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACHIEVEMENT-ORIENTED FORMS OF SPORT

According to Durkheim, the structure of industrial societies is characterized by high 'material' and high 'moral' or 'dynamic' density, that is by a highly concentrated population and a high rate of social interaction between individuals and groups.<sup>17</sup> He believed that the competitive pressures generated in such a society would be reduced and perhaps eliminated by the division of labour. The division of labour, he suggested, would have that effect in two main ways: by creating 'bonds of interdependence' and by siphoning competitively generated tensions into specialized occupational spheres. However, his analysis contains a fundamental flaw that derives from his failure to recognize that functional interdependence or division of labour does not lead necessarily to harmonious and co-operative integration but is conducive, even in its 'normal' forms, to conflict and antagonism. In short, his concept of the society based on 'organic solidarity' is utopian. A more realistic concept of interdependence is that proposed by Elias.

According to Elias, the long-term social transformation usually referred to by terms denoting specific aspects such as 'industrialization', 'economic growth', the 'demographic transition', 'urbanization' and 'political modernization', is in fact, a long-term transformation of the total social structure.<sup>18</sup> And, he contends, one of the sociologically most significant aspects of this total social transformation consists in the emergence of longer and more differentiated 'chains of interdependence'. That is, it involves the emergence of greater functional specialization and the integration of functionally differentiated groups into wider networks. Moreover, concomitantly with this, there occurs, according to Elias, a change in the direction of decreasing power-differentials within and among groups, more specifically, a change in the balance of power between rulers and ruled, the social classes, men and women, the generations, parents and children. Such a process occurs because the performers of specialized roles are dependent on others and can, therefore, exert reciprocal control. The power-chances of specialized groups are further enhanced if they manage to organize since, then, they are able to disrupt the wider system of interdependencies by collective action. It is in ways such as these, according to Elias, that increasing division of labour and the emergence of longer chains of interdependence leads to greater reciprocal dependency, and, hence, to patterns of 'multipolar control' within and among groups, that is to an overall social figuration in which specific individuals and groups are subject to increasingly effective pressure from others. Such pressure is effective because of the reciprocal dependencies involved.

The relevance of this deceptively simple theory for the present analysis is manifold. Inherent in the modern structure of social interdependencies is the demand for inter-regional and representative sport. No such demand arose in pre-industrial societies because the lack of effective national unification and poor means of transport and communication meant that there were no common rules and no means by which sportsmen from different areas could be brought regularly together. At the same time, the 'localism' inherent in such societies meant that play-groups perceived as potential rivals only groups with which they were contiguous in a geographical sense. However, modern industrial societies are different on all these counts. They are relatively unified nationally, have superior means of transport and communication, sports with common rules, and a degree of 'cosmopolitanism' which means that local groups perceive as potential rivals, and are anxious to compare themselves with others which are not geographically adjacent. Hence, such societies are characterized by high rates of inter-area sporting interaction, a process that leads to stratification internally in specific sports – to a hierarchical grading of sportsmen, sportswomen and sports teams with those that represent the largest units standing at the top.

In its turn, this means that the reciprocal pressures and controls that operate in urban-industrial societies generally are replicated in the sphere of sport. As a result, top-level sportsmen and women cannot be independent and play for fun but are forced to be other-directed and serious in their sports participation. That is, they are unable to play for themselves but constrained to represent wider social units such as cities, counties and countries. As such, they are provided with material and/or prestige rewards and facilities and time for training. In return, they are expected to produce a 'sports-performance', that is the sort of satisfactions which the controllers and 'consumers' of the sport demand, namely the spectacle of an exciting contest that people are willing to pay to watch or the validation through victory of the 'image' and 'reputation' of the social unit with which the controllers and/or consumers identify. The sheer numbers of people involved and the local, regional, national and international competitive framework of modern sport work in the same direction. They mean that high and sustained achievement-motivation, long-term planning, strict self-control and renunciation of immediate gratification, in other words constant practice and training, are necessary in order to get to, and stay at, the top. They also necessitate a degree of bureaucratic control and hence lead to the subordination of sportsmen in yet another respect.

In each of these ways, the social figuration, the pattern of inter-group dependencies, characteristic of an urban-industrial-nation-state gener-

ates constraints which militate against the practical realization of the amateur ethos with its stress on enjoyment as the central aim of sport. Or more properly, it generates constraints which militate against the realization of immediate, short-term enjoyment, against each sporting contest as an 'end in itself', and leads to its replacement, both for players and spectators, by longer-term goals such as victory in a league or cup, by satisfactions more centrally concerned with identity and prestige. Moreover, such constraints are not confined to top-level sport but reverberate down to the lowest levels of sporting achievement. That is partly because top-level sportsmen and women form a media-promoted reference group who set standards which others try to follow. It is also partly a consequence of the pressures generated by competition for the material and prestige rewards which can be obtained by getting to the top. However, it is by no means only due to pressures that are generated solely within sport but also, and perhaps, more centrally, a consequence of the deep-rooted and pervasive anxieties and insecurities generated more generally in a society characterized by multipolar pressures and controls, and in which props of identity and status connected with traditional forms of class, authority, sex and age relations have all been eroded by functional democratization, that is by the equalizing process which, according to Elias, is inherent in the division of labour.

## VI SUGGESTIONS REGARDING THE GROWING SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF SPORT

So far, I have provided the outlines of a figurational explanation of the trend towards increasingly serious involvement in sport. The related development in the course of which its social significance has grown remains to be discussed. This is a complex issue and can only be touched on briefly in the present context. Apart from the changing balance, ideological as well as factual, between work and leisure, a process which has increased the social significance of leisure activities generally, a constellation of at least three interrelated aspects of the emergent modern social figuration can be singled out as having contributed to the growing social significance of sport, namely: (1) the fact that sport has developed as one of the principal media for the generation of pleasurable excitement; (2) the fact that sport has come to function as one of the principal media of collective identification; and (3) the fact that sport has come to form a key source of meaning in the lives of many people.

Elias and I have suggested elsewhere that sport is a 'mimetic' leisure

event in which pleasurable excitement can be generated and that, in this respect, it performs a 'de-routinizing' function.<sup>19</sup> There is, however, no society without controls and routines or, as Elias has put it, no 'zero-point' of civilization. In that sense, the need for de-routinization is probably socially universal. But urban-industrial societies are highly routinized and civilized, characterized by multipolar pressures and controls. Accordingly, their members are constrained continuously to exercise a high degree of emotional restraint in their ordinary, everyday lives, with the consequence that the need for de-routinizing leisure activities such as sports in such societies is particularly intense. However, this de-routinizing process, this socially permitted arousal of emotion in public, is itself subject to civilizing controls. That is, sport is a social enclave, both for players and spectators, where pleasurable excitement can be generated in a form that is socially limited and controlled.

Nevertheless, the excitement generated can be intense, especially at top-level sports events which attract large crowds and, *pace* Huizinga who argued that sport has become 'profane', it is probably this that forms the experiential basis for the widespread perception of sport as a 'sacred' phenomenon. Durkheim argued that the collective excitement or 'effervescence' generated in the religious ceremonies of the Australian aborigines formed the principal experiential source of their idea of a 'sacred' realm,<sup>20</sup> and it seems not unreasonable to suppose that the generation of 'collective effervescence' in sports events lies at the root of the fact that it is common, at least in Britain, to refer to football and cricket pitches, especially those used for representative matches, as the 'sacred' or 'hallowed' turf. Indeed, it would probably not be going too far to suggest that, at least for some groups in present-day society, sport has become a quasi-religious activity and that, viewed from a societal perspective, it has come, to some extent, to fill the gap in social life left by the decline of religion. An extreme but none the less indicative example of this quasi-religious character of modern sport is provided by the fact that it has apparently become a tradition in Liverpool for deceased supporters of Liverpool FC to have their ashes strewn on the Anfield pitch; they seem to wish to remain identified even after death with the 'shrine' or 'temple' at which they 'worshipped' during life. But even short of this extreme, it is clear that playing and/or watching one sport or another has come to form one of the principal media of collective identification in modern society and one of the principal sources of meaning in life for many people. In short, it is by no means unrealistic to suggest that sport is coming increasingly to form the secular religion of our increasingly secular age.

It is probably the inherently oppositional character of sport, that is

the fact that it is a struggle for victory between two or more teams or two or more individuals, that accounts for its prominence as a focus for collective identification. This means that it lends itself to group identification, more precisely to 'in-group' and 'out-group', or 'we-group' and 'they-group' formation on a variety of levels, such as the levels of city, county or country. The oppositional element is crucial since opposition serves to reinforce in-group identification, that is, a group's sense of 'we-ness' or unity is strengthened by the presence of a group who are perceived as 'them', the opposing team, whether local or national, and its supporters. Indeed, within the context of domestically pacified nation-states that is in societies where the state has established an effective monopoly on the right to use physical force, sport provides the only occasion on which large, complex and impersonal social units such as cities can unite. Similarly, at the international level, sporting events such as the Olympic Games and the World Cup provide the only peacetime occasions where whole nation-states are able regularly and visibly to unite. The international expansion of sport has been predicated on the growth of international interdependence and the existence, with several notable exceptions, of a fragile and unstable world peace. Contests such as the Olympics allow the representatives of different nations to compete without killing one another, though the degree to which such contests are transformed from mock-fights into 'real' ones is a function, *inter alia*, of the pre-existing level of tension between the particular nation-states involved. And, of course, it is in order to participate effectively at this highest level of sporting competition that the highest levels of sustained achievement-motivation, self-control and self-denial on the part of sportsmen are required.

This brings me to my final point: namely that the social pressure on sportsmen and women in countries all over the world to strive for success in international competition is a further source of the destruction of the play-element in sport. Moreover, it is that, and the increment to national prestige that success in international sport can yield, which has contributed principally to the tendency towards the involvement of the state in sport which Huizinga deplored. It has been argued that sport is a viable substitute for war but such an idea involves viewing it as an abstraction, as something independent and apart from the figurations of interdependent human beings who take part in it. That is the crucial issue: namely, whether the figurations formed by interdependent human beings, in sport and elsewhere, are conducive to co-operation or friendly rivalry, or whether they persistently generate serious fighting. That is a subject on which sociological research has hardly yet begun. There is, however, at least one notable exception: the work of Norbert Elias on which I have tried to model this paper.



- is currently used in sociology. We are not referring to other theories of small groups, such as, for example, those concerned with problems of group therapy, although in those cases, too, the figurational approach may be of help.
- 3 G. Green, *The History of the Football Association*, London, 1953.
  - 4 G. Homans, *Social Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms*, London, 1961, p. 130.
  - 5 R. Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, London, 1959, p. 164.
  - 6 It has been dealt with extensively in Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, Oxford, 1978, and *State Formation and Civilization*, Oxford, 1982.
  - 7 See chapter 5 of the present volume.
  - 8 For a sociological analysis of the development of football in the public schools, see Eric Dunning and Kenneth Sheard, *Barbarians, Gentlemen and Players*, Oxford, 1979.
  - 9 In order to avoid misunderstanding one has to add that the term 'sociological realism' as used here does not mean what it means if it is applied to Durkheim's theory. Durkheim could not escape from a position where social phenomena appeared as something abstracted and apart from individuals. These abstractions he sometimes reified: he never got beyond a stage where 'society' and 'individuals' appear as separate entities which he tried to bring together again in the end by an almost mystical hypothesis. This criticism is perfectly compatible with the recognition of the intellectual calibre of his work and the scientific advances due to him.
  - 10 There is one characteristic difference between the tension-balance of antagonistic muscles and that of antagonistic players in a game. In the case of muscles, one side relaxes when the other is tensed. In the case of players, the specific character of the tension-balance is due to the fact that both sides are 'tensed'.

## 7 THE DYNAMICS OF MODERN SPORT

- 1 This essay was previously published in *Sportwissenschaft*, vol. 9, 1979, 4, under the title 'The Figurational Dynamics of Modern Sport: Notes on the Sociogenesis of Achievement-Striving and the Social Significance of Sport'. It is based on the analysis in Eric Dunning and Kenneth Sheard, *Barbarians, Gentlemen and Players*, Oxford, 1979. However the analysis presented here goes beyond that presented there in a number of ways.
- 2 For a full documentation and analysis of this process, see *ibid*.
- 3 *The Civilizing Process*, Oxford, 1978.
- 4 *What is Sociology?*, London, 1978.
- 5 That is to say from an evaluation that reflected the interests and values of specific groups in the wider society and that was not worked out autonomously by us specifically for purposes of sociological analysis. See Norbert Elias, 'Problems of Involvement and Detachment', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 7, 1956, pp. 226-52.

- 6 Norbert Elias and Eric Dunning, 'Dynamics of Sport Groups with Special Reference to Football', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 17, 1966, p. 79, and chapter 6 of this volume.
- 7 J. Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: a Study of the Play Element in Culture*, London, 1949.
- 8 G. P. Stone, 'American Sports: Play and Dis-Play', in Eric Dunning (ed.), *The Sociology of Sport: a Selection of Readings*, London, 1971.
- 9 B. Rigauer, *Sport und Arbeit*, Frankfurt, 1969.
- 10 *Homo Ludens*, pp. 223 f.
- 11 The term 'functional democratization' was, in fact, coined later by Elias to represent more adequately what he had earlier referred to simply as 'growing structural pressure from below'.
- 12 State-formation, functional democratization and the civilizing process can, I think, also explain this trend more satisfactorily than the hypothesis that a Weberian might develop in this connection, for example that there may be a *Wahlverwandtschaft* or 'elective affinity' between ascetic Protestantism and serious, achievement-oriented forms of sports participation in much the same way that such a relationship was held by Weber to have existed between ascetic Protestantism and the 'spirit of capitalism'. Such an hypothesis is a priori plausible but runs into difficulties such as that posed by the fact that, in England at least, the ascetic Protestants tried to ban sports and pastimes altogether. In any case, Elias's hypothesis is more inclusive and could, potentially at any rate, account sociogenetically for the Protestant ethic. Moreover, with its dissolution and transcendence, firstly, of the dichotomy between 'the material' and 'the ideal', and secondly of that between 'causes' and 'effects' – with its stress on nexuses or constellations of interacting causes and effects, or, more properly, with its concern with the specifically *social*, that is relational dynamics of social figurations. Elias's method does not lead to the insuperable methodological difficulties that Weber's approach entails.
- 13 A. Trollope, *British Sports and Pastimes*, London, 1868, pp. 6-7.
- 14 Cf. M. Marples, *A History of Football*, London, 1954.
- 15 I have called the late nineteenth-century British ruling class the 'public school elite' in order to signify the role of the public schools in unifying its established, landed and ascendant, bourgeois sections.
- 16 The Corinthians were an amateur team, formed towards the end of the nineteenth century and recruited from the public schools and the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, who were able for a while to hold their own in competition with the professionals. They were a 'symptomatic exception' to the general trend towards exclusiveness on the part of the public school elite in the sense that they were deliberately formed to combat the growing success of professional teams and to celebrate and sustain the cherished amateur ideal. However, in adopting a non-local, non-institutionally specific pattern of recruitment, they incorporated one of the 'abuses' that were held by the proponents of the amateur ideal, to be destroyed by professionalism. That is, just like the professional teams

which were recruited on a national basis the Corinthians moved away from a pattern of sports representation in which locally and institutionally specific teams, recruited from 'communities' of various kinds, were held to be an essential characteristic of 'true' sport.

- 17 E. Durkheim, *The Division of Labour in Society*, New York, 1964.
- 18 *What is Sociology?*, pp. 63 f., 99 f.
- 19 See chapter 1 of this volume.
- 20 *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, London, 1976.

## 8 SOCIAL BONDING AND VIOLENCE IN SPORT

- 1 This essay was previously published in Jeffrey H. Goldstein (ed.), *Sports Violence*, New York, 1983, under the title 'Social Bonding and Violence in Sport: A Theoretical-Empirical Analysis'. I am grateful to Johan Goudsblom for his helpful comments on an earlier version.
- 2 H. J. Eysenck and K. D. Nias, *Sex, Violence and the Media*, New York, 1978.
- 3 P. Marsh, *Aggro: the Illusion of Violence*, London, 1979.
- 4 A. Yiannakis, T. D. McIntyre, M. J. Melnick, and D. P. Hart (eds), *Sport Sociology: Contemporary Themes*, Dubuque, Iowa, 1976.
- 5 K. Weis, 'Role Models and the Social Learning of Violent Behaviour Patterns', *Proceedings of the International Congress of Physical Activity Sciences*, Quebec, 1976, pp. 511-24.
- 6 For this theory, see Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, Oxford, 1978; and *State Formation and Civilization*, Oxford, 1982.
- 7 L. Tiger, *Men in Groups*, London, 1969; R. Fox, 'The Inherent Rules of Fighting', in P. Collett (ed.), *Social Rules and Social Behaviour*, Oxford, 1977.
- 8 P. Marsh, E. Rosser and R. Harré, *The Rules of Disorder*, London, 1978.
- 9 R. Gardner and K. Heider, *Gardens of War*, Harmondsworth, 1974.
- 10 G. Owen, *The Description of Pembrokeshire*, in H. Owed (ed.), *Cymmrodorion Society Research Series*, no. 1, 1892, pp. 270-82. It was originally published in 1603.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Eric Dunning and Kenneth Sheard, *Barbarians, Gentlemen and Players*, Oxford, 1979.
- 13 D. Riesman and R. Denney, 'Football in America: a Study in Culture Diffusion', in Eric Dunning (ed.), *The Sociology of Sport: a Selection of Readings*, London, 1971.
- 14 J. Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, New York, 1924.
- 15 Marsh et al., *The Rules of Disorder*.
- 16 Marsh, *Aggro*.
- 17 E. Bott, *Family and Social Network*, London, 1957; P. Wilmott and M. Young, *Family and Kinship in East London*, London, 1957; H. J. Parker, *View from the Boys*, Newton Abbott, 1974; P. Willis, *Profane Culture*, London, 1978.

## 9 SPECTATOR VIOLENCE AT FOOTBALL MATCHES

- 1 This paper is based on the 1984 Edward Glover Lecture given by Eric Dunning at the Royal Free Hospital, London. This series of annual lectures is organized by the Portman Clinic. We are grateful to Ilya Neustadt and Tim Newburn for their critical comments on an earlier draft of the paper.
- 2 See John Williams, Eric Dunning and Patrick Murphy, *Hooligans Abroad: the Behaviour and Control of English Fans in Continental Europe*, London, 1984; also *The Roots of Football Hooliganism: an Historical and Sociological Study*, London, forthcoming.
- 3 Paul Harrison, 'Soccer's Tribal Wars', *New Society*, 1974, vol. 29, p. 604.
- 4 See the discussion in Peter Marsh, Elizabeth Rosser and Rom Harré, *The Rules of Disorder*, London, 1978, pp. 70-2.
- 5 Simon Jacobson, 'Chelsea Rule - OK', *New Society*, 1975, vol. 31, pp. 780-3.
- 6 It is perhaps worth pointing out that football match duties provide the police with opportunities both for overtime earnings and for obtaining a welcome relief from normal routines. At football matches, too, not only the hooligans but also the police are provided with opportunities for 'action' in an exciting context. Moreover, on account of the opprobrium which football hooliganism has attracted, it is a context in which the strategies employed by the police seldom draw public criticism.
- 7 Ian Taylor, 'Football Mad: a Speculative Sociology of Football Hooliganism', in Eric Dunning (ed.), *The Sociology of Sport: a Selection of Readings*, London, 1971, pp. 352-7; see also his 'Soccer Consciousness and Soccer Hooliganism', in Stan Cohen (ed.), *Images of Deviance*, Harmondsworth, 1971, pp. 134-64.
- 8 John Clarke, 'Football and Working-Class Fans: Tradition and Change', in Roger Ingham (ed.), *Football Hooliganism: the Wider Context*, London, 1978, pp. 37-60.
- 9 Ibid., p. 51.
- 10 Stuart Hall, 'The Treatment of "Football Hooliganism" in the Press', in Ingham (ed.), *Football Hooliganism*, pp. 15-36.
- 11 See Stuart Hall et al., *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order*, London, 1978.
- 12 Ian Taylor, 'On the Sports Violence Question: Soccer Hooliganism Revisited', in Jennifer Hargreaves (ed.), *Sport, Culture and Ideology*, London, 1982, pp. 152-96; 'Class, Violence and Sport: the Case of Soccer Hooliganism in Britain', in Hart Cantelon and Richard S. Gruneau (eds), *Sport, Culture and the Modern State*, Toronto, 1982, pp. 39-93. David Robins and Philip Cohen recognize the intra-class conflict dimension to the problem when they write: 'The pathos and futility of fighting amongst rival groups of socially dispossessed youth is the best demonstration of the extent of the victory of those who really do hold the class power over them.' See their *Knuckle Sandwich: Growing Up in the Working Class City*, Harmondsworth, 1978, p. 151.